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A 2-Secure Code with Eﬃcient Tracing
Algorithm
Vu Dong Tô, Reihaneh Safavi-Naini, and Yejing Wang
School of Information Technology and Computer Science
University of Wollongong, Wollongong 2522, Australia
{dong,rei,yejing}@uow.edu.au

Abstract. Collusion secure ﬁngerprinting is used to protect against illegal redistribution of digital documents. Fingerprints are embedded in
documents to identify diﬀerent copies. A group of colluders having access to multiple copies with diﬀerent ﬁngerprints may construct a pirate
object with a ﬁngerprint that cannot be traced. We consider c-secure
codes with ε error that allow one of the c possible colluders to be traced
and the chance of incorrect tracing to be at most ε. We consider a two
layer construction consisting of an inner code and an outer structure and
give new constructions for each. Important properties of our new inner
code is that innocent users will never be accused and the code can be
constructed for any number of codewords. This is particularly important
as the number of codewords is the alphabet size of the outer structure.
We will show that for the outer structure a c-traceability code, or a perfect hash family can be used and obtain the parameters of the combined
code in terms of the parameters of the inner code and those of the outer
structure. We apply these constructions to our new inner code and give
parameters of the resulting c-secure codes.
Keywords: ﬁngerprinting codes, frameproof codes, secure codes, secure
frameproof codes, traceability codes.
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Introduction

Fingerprinting is used to distinguish diﬀerent copies of the same document or
software. A ﬁngerprint is a q-ary mark sequence that is embedded in the object
in an imperceptible and robust (hard to remove) way. Collusion secure ﬁngerprinting [3] aims at tracing pirate objects constructed by a collusion of users
who have access to multiple copies of the same object, each with a diﬀerent
ﬁngerprint.
To construct a pirate object, colluders compare their objects to ﬁnd the places
where their marks are diﬀerent, and construct a pirate object by using one of
their marks in each detected position. Totally c-secure codes allow one of the
colluders to be traced if the size of the collusion is at most c. Boneh et al showed
that totally c-secure codes do not exist for c ≥ 2 and introduced c-secure codes
with ε-error in which a member of collusion will be found with probability of at


least 1 − ε. The ε-error refers to the error of the tracing algorithm. The error
could be due to the failure of the algorithm to trace some of the pirate objects,
or to output an innocent user in some cases. The latter case is undesirable for
realistic scenarios and must be avoided.
Important parameters of c-secure codes are the length and the number of
codewords. Good codes have shorter length and higher number of codewords.
The main construction of c-secure codes is due to Boneh et al. [3, 4] and
consists of an outer code which is an error-correcting code, and an inner code.
Other constructions retain this structure but give diﬀerent construction for the
inner code.
In this paper we present a number of new results on 2-secure codes. The main
construction that we consider is a two level construction that consists of an inner
code and an outer structure. The outer structure can be an error-correcting code,
or a perfect hash family. The set of codewords of the inner code form the alphabet
set of the outer code and so we require inner codes to be constructible for a wide
range of alphabet sizes. In particular to compare two inner codes we will ﬁx the
size of the alphabet.
Firstly, we construct a new 2-secure inner code of length n2 with n codewords
and give an upper bound on ε which shows that the probability of error decreases
exponentially with n. We give an eﬃcient tracing algorithm for this code and
show that the tracing algorithm never accuses an innocent user. That is either
tracing algorithm fails and does not output, or else it outputs a colluder. An
interesting property of the code is that for the same error probability it has
shorter length when compared with the inner code in [3, 4], or [9] with the same
number of codewords. Although the inner code in [3, 4] is only for c-secure codes
with c ≥ 3 but since a c-secure code is also a c -secure for c < c we will compare
our code with an instance of the code with the same number of codewords.
Then we consider possible outer structures. First, we show that using a 2-TA
code as the outer structure combined with a 2-secure code with ε error results in
a 2-secure code with ε error and give the value of ε . 2-TA codes can be obtained
from error-correcting codes whose minimum distance satisfy a lower bound. We
will show that equi-distance codes with odd minimum distance are 2-TA codes
and can always be used for the outer code.
Next we show that perfect hash families (PHF) can be used as the outer
structure to construct a c-secure code with more codewords from a smaller csecure code. We will obtain probability of failure of tracing as a function of ε
and s, the number of functions in the perfect hash family.
The tracing algorithm in the case of error-correcting codes consists of two
stages: ﬁrst using the decoding algorithm of the outer code followed by the
tracing algorithm of the inner code. In the case of PHF as outer code, tracing
consist of ﬁnding a function in the family that satisﬁes certain property followed
by the tracing of the inner code. Eﬃciency of the former stage of tracing depends
on the structure of PHF.

A 2-Secure Code with Eﬃcient Tracing Algorithm

We will use both outer structures with our proposed inner code and obtain
the parameters of the resulting codes. The ﬁnal code in all cases will have the
property that only colluders will be captured.
1.1

Related Works

Secure ﬁngerprinting codes have been deﬁned with a range of security properties.
Frameproof codes
Frameproof codes are introduced in [3], and constructed in [3, 4, 12, 13]. A cframeproof code provides a property that any up to c colluders cannot create
the ﬁngerprint of an innocent user. Constructions of frameproof codes are given
by [3, 12, 10].
Secure frameproof codes
A weak notion of secure codes is secure frameproof codes. A c-secure frameproof code is deﬁned and constructed by Stinson et al in [11] requires that two
disjoint collusions not be able to create the same pirate word. c-Secure frameproof code do not provide tracing algorithm and only require the structure of
the code to support unambiguous tracing.
Traceability codes
Traceability codes are introduced by Staddon et al in [10]. A c-TA code
provide frameproofness and traceability property. That is a group of up to c
colluders cannot frame another user and any pirate word that they construct is
closet to the codeword of one of the colluders and so a colluder can always be
found by ﬁnding the codeword with minimum Hamming distance to the pirate
word. c-TA codes can be constructed from error-correcting codes. For these codes
tracing algorithm is the same as decoding algorithm of the error-correcting code.
This is particularly useful for codes that have eﬃcient decoding algorithm.
Traitor tracing schemes
Traitor tracing schemes are introduced in the context of broadcast encryption systems [6] and data ﬁngerprinting [3]. In a broadcast encryption system,
the sender broadcasts an encrypted message through a broadcast channel such
that only members of an authorised group of receivers can decrypt the message.
To do so, each receiver has a decoder with a unique key set. A group of colluders
may use their key information to construct a pirate decoder that can decrypt
the broadcast. Traitor tracing schemes allow one of the colluders to be identiﬁed when a pirate decoder is found. Known constructions of traitor tracing
systems use combinatorial designs [12, 13], and error-correcting codes [12]. Tracing traitors in public key encryption systems are proposed in [2]. It is shown [7]
that tracing is impossible when the number of traitors exceeds a certain number.
The rest of the paper is organised as follows. In Section 2 we recall the
deﬁnitions and review the known results that will be used throughout the paper.
In Section 3 we deﬁne a new inner code, provide an eﬃcient tracing algorithm
and show the properties of the code. We construct 2-secure codes by combining
our new inner code with error-correcting codes in Section 4, and with perfect
hash families in Section 5. Finally, we compare our constructions with existing
ones and conclude the paper in Section 6.

2

Preliminaries

Let Γ be a q-ary code of length  and size n. We have Γ ⊆ Q , where Q is a set
of alphabets, |Q| = q, and |Γ | = n. An element of Γ , called a codeword, can be
written as w = (w1 , w2 , . . . , w ), where wi ∈ Q. Elements of Q in general are
called words.
Let C = {w(1) , w(2) , . . . , w(c) } ⊆ Γ . A position i is called an undetectable
(1)
(2)
(c)
position for C if wi = wi = . . . = wi ; otherwise, it is called a detectable
position. We denote the set of all undetectable and detectable positions for C as
U (C) and D(C). Deﬁne the descendant set of C as
Desc(C) = {w ∈ Q : wi ∈ {wi , wi , . . . , wi }, ∀i}.
(1)

(2)

(c)

Desc(C) is the set of all words that can be constructed by the coalition C. An
element w of Desc(C) is called a descendant of C and elements of C are called
parents of w.
We use the following Marking Assumption and Embedding Assumption
which were ﬁrst introduced in [3].
Marking Assumption: A collusion is only capable of modifying detectable
positions.
Embedding Assumption: A user has no knowledge of which mark in the
object encodes which bit in the code.
Colluders can modify the symbols at detectable positions and can replace
them with any symbol in the alphabet or replace it with an unrecognizable
symbol, denoted by ‘?’, that is not in the alphabet Q. We call Q = Q ∪ {?} as
the extended alphabet. And we deﬁne the feasible set F (C) of C as


F (C) = {w ∈ Q : wi = wi

(j)

∀i ∈ U (C), w(j) ∈ C}

If Γ is a binary code then Desc(C) contains precisely all the elements of
F (C) that do not contain marks ‘?’. If an element of F (C) contains ‘?’ in some
positions, if we substitute these marks ‘?’ by any symbol of Q, then the resulting
word must belong to Desc(C). This is only true if the code Γ is binary.
Lemma 1. Let Γ be a binary code, and C ⊆ Γ . For an element of F (C),
substituting all the marks ‘?’ by 0 or 1 arbitrarily will result in an element of
Desc(C).
Frameproof codes introduced in [3], ensure that subset of colluders of size at
most c cannot produce the codeword of another user not in their group.
Definition 1. ([10]) A code Γ is called a c-frameproof code (c-FPC) if
Desc(C) ∩ Γ = C for every subset C ⊆ Γ of size at most c.
A code Γ is called a secure frameproof code if two disjoint coalitions cannot
produce the same descendant word.

Definition 2. ([10]) A code Γ is called a c-secure frameproof code (c-SFPC) if
Desc(C1 ) ∩ Desc(C2 ) = ∅ for any two disjoint subsets C1 , C2 ⊆ Γ of sizes at
most c.
Obviously, a c-SFPC is a c-frameproof code.
Definition 3. A code Γ is called totally c-secure if there exists a tracing algo
rithm A : Q → Γ such that A(x) ∈ C for every C ⊆ Γ of size at most c and
x ∈ F (C).
It was proved in [3, 4] that totally c-secure codes do not exist when c ≥ 2
and n ≥ 3. A weakened form of totally secure codes is to allow the tracing to
fail with a small chance.
Definition 4. ([3]) Let ε > 0. A code Γ is called c-secure with ε-error if there
exists a tracing algorithm A satisfying condition: if C ⊆ Γ , |C| ≤ c, creates
a word x ∈ F (C), then
P r[A(x) ∈ C] > 1 − ε.
(1)
Boneh et al [3, 4] gave a construction for c-secure codes which combines an
inner c-secure code with an error-correcting code. The number of codewords of
the inner code is much smaller than its length but in combination with the outer
code results in a c-secure code whose length is logarithmic in the number of
codewords. This is only an existence result and no explicit construction for the
outer code with the required parameters has been given. A drawback of the inner
code in Boneh et al’s construction is that an innocent user may be accused and
this will hold for the ﬁnal construction as well. The chance of error can be made
arbitrarily small but increasing the code length.
Other constructions [5, 9] of c-secure codes use the same structure but employ
diﬀerent inner codes. In [5] a family of 2-secure codes was proposed that uses
the dual of the Hamming code as the inner code. The number of codewords
of this inner code is nearly the same as its length and so the ﬁnal code will
have higher rate (ratio of the logarithm of the number of codewords to the
length) compared to the construction in [3, 4]. Another advantage of this code
is that the tracing algorithm uses the decoding algorithm of the dual of the
Hamming code, and never outputs an innocent user. The number of codewords
is 2n and since the number of codewords of the inner code is the same as the
alphabet size of the outer code, the higher rate is when the outer code is over
GF (2n ). In [9] a construction of a 3-secure codes using a class of inner codes
called scattering codes, and an outer code which is a dual of the Hamming code
is given. The tracing algorithm may output an innocent user and the code is
shown to outperforms the code in [3, 4] for some parameters. This construction
results in false accusation.
In all above constructions an ‘inner code’ is combined with an outer code
which is an error-correcting code (dual Hamming code in that last construction).
The inner code in the ﬁrst construction is a 2-secure code with n codewords and
length (n − 1)d, and in the last one, is a scattering code with 2n codewords and

length (2n + 1)d and is the same as the ﬁrst construction with an added ﬁrst
column. In Boneh et al construction, d = 2n2 log(2n/ε). That is for n codewords,
the length of the inner code is ≈ n3 (log(2n/ε)) and the code is n-secure.
In [4], with error ε, the inner code has n codeword and length O(n3 log n/ε),
the tracing algorithm may output innocent users. In [5], using dual binary Hamming code, a code of size n length n and error 2n/2n is constructed. However,
the code size must of the form n = 2i − 1. In [9], a 3-secure code is introduced
with code size of the same form 2i − 1. The length of this code is (n − 1)(2t + 1)d.
In the next section, we will construct a new 2-secure inner code with an
arbitrary size n. Our tracing algorithm either fails or outputs a real colluder.

3

A New Inner Code

In this section we construct a binary code γ and prove that the code is a 2SFPC. We give an eﬃcient tracing algorithm and show that the code is a 2secure code and calculate the error probability in tracing. We show that if the
pirate word contains at least one mark ‘?’ then the tracing algorithm correctly
outputs a colluder.
2
The codewords are elements of the set {0, 1}n and can be represented by
n × n binary matrices. To construct the code, we choose n base-points b1 , b2 ,
. . . , bn , each point being a position of the n × n matrix such that there is exactly
one base-point on each row and on each column. That is, if we assume the basepoint bi is on the row ri and column ci , then (r1 , r2 , . . . , rn ) and (c1 , c2 , . . . , cn )
are permutations of (1, 2, . . . , n). For a square matrix M of order n, we denote by
M (r, c) the entry in the rth row and the cth column. Now n codewords M1 , M2 ,
. . . , Mn are constructed as follows.
For each i, 1 ≤ i ≤ n, Mi is an n × n binary matrix whose (r, c) entry is
given by

 1, if r = ri and c = ci
Mi (r, c) = 1, if r = ri and c = ci

0, otherwise
For two base-points bi1 , bi2 , deﬁne
Rec(i1 , i2 ) = {(r, c) : r ∈ {ri1 , ri2 }, c ∈ {ci1 , ci2 }}
Rec(i1 , i2 ) is the set of four vertices of the rectangle formed by the two basepoints bi1 , bi2 . We call the pair of vertices (ri1 , ci2 ) and (ri2 , ci1 ) opposite basepoints and denote by Opp(i1 , i2 ) = {(ri1 , ci2 ), (ri2 , ci1 )}.
For any two codewords Mi1 and Mi2 , it is easy to see that the set of undetectable positions consists of four vertices of Rec(i1 , i2 ) together with all the
positions that are not on rows ri1 , ri2 and not on columns ci1 , ci2 . The detectable
positions are the positions on the rows ri1 , ri2 and columns ci1 , ci2 , except for
the four positions of Rec(i1 , i2 ). The number of detectable positions is 4n − 8.
D(C) = {(r, c) : r ∈ {ri1 , ri2 } or c ∈ {ci1 , ci2 }} \ Rec(i1 , i2 )
U (C) = {(r, c) : r = ri1 , ri2 , c = ci1 , ci2 } ∪ Rec(i1 , i2 )

2

Theorem 1. For a matrix M ∈ {0, 1, ?}n , M is a member of F (Mi1 , Mi2 ) if
and only if
1. M has the values 0 on the two base-points bi1 and bi2
M (ri1 , ci1 ) = M (ri2 , ci2 ) = 0
2. M has the values 1 on the two opposite base-points Opp(i1 , i2 )
M (ri1 , ci2 ) = M (ri2 , ci1 ) = 1
3. M has the values 0 on all the positions that are not on the row ri1 , ri2 , and
not on the column ci1 , ci2
M (r, c) = 0 for all r = ri1 , ri2 , c = ci1 , ci2
Theorem 2. For any n ≥ 4, γ is a 2-secure frameproof code.
Proof. Let Mi1 , Mi2 , Mi3 and Mi4 be four diﬀerent codewords. ¿From Theorem 1, for any descendant M of {Mi1 , Mi2 } and M  of {Mi3 , Mi4 }, M (ri1 , ci2 ) =
M (ri2 , ci1 ) = 1 and M  (ri1 , ci2 ) = M  (ri2 , ci1 ) = 0. This implies M = M  .
Definition 5. Let M be a binary matrix of size n. The set ColluderP air(M )
is defined as follows
1. a member of ColluderP air(M ) is a subset of {M1 , M2 , . . . , Mn } with two
element
2. {Mi1 , Mi2 } ∈ ColluderP air(M ) if and only if
(T1) M (ri1 , ci1 ) = M (ri2 , ci2 ) = 0,
(T2) M (ri1 , ci2 ) = M (ri2 , ci1 ) = 1, and
(T3) M (r, c) = 0, for all r = ri1 , ri2 , c = ci1 , ci2 .
ColluderP air(M ) is the set of all pairs of colluders that could have generated M
ColluderP air(M ) = {{Mi1 , Mi2 } : M ∈ Desc(Mi1 , Mi2 )}
3.1

Properties of ColluderP air(M )

In this section, we will look at the properties of the set ColluderP air(M ) which
help us to derive tracing algorithm. We need the following lemma.
Lemma 2. Suppose {S1 , S2 , . . . , Sk } is a collection of sets such that
1. Each set contains exactly two elements,
2. Any two sets have non-empty intersection, and
3. Union of all these sets contains more than three elements | ∪ki=1 Si | > 3
then

∩ki=1 Si = ∅

Proof. Assume S1 = {x1 , x2 }, S2 = {x1 , x3 }, x4 ∈ S3 . Since S3 has non-empty
intersections with both S1 and S2 , we must have S3 = {x1 , x4 }. For any other
set Sj , 4 ≤ j ≤ k, since Sj has non-empty intersections with all three sets S1 , S2
and S3 , Sj must contains x1 . Therefore,
Lemma 3. Let M be given. If S1 , S2 ∈ ColludeP air(M ), then S1 ∩ S2 = ∅.
Proof. Follows from Theorem 2.
For any three base-points bi1 , bi2 and bi3 , let SM [i1 , i2 , i3 ] be the binary matrix whose entries are all zeros except for the six opposite base-points Opp(i1 , i2 ),
Opp(i2 , i3 ) and Opp(i3 , i1 ). ¿From now on, these matrices SM [i1 , i2 , i3 ] are called
special matrices. It is easy to check that the special matrix SM [i1 , i2 , i3 ] belong to
all three descendant sets Desc(Mi1 , Mi2 ), Desc(Mi2 , Mi3 ) and Desc(Mi3 , Mi1 ).
Special matrices are characterised by the following Lemma.
Lemma 4. ColluderP air(M ) = {{Mi1 , Mi2 }, {Mi2 , Mi3 }, {Mi3 , Mi1 }}
if and only if M = SM [i1 , i2 , i3 ].
Proof. Firstly, if {Mi1 , Mi2 }, {Mi2 , Mi3 }, {Mi3 , Mi1 } ∈ ColluderP air(M ) then
it follows from Deﬁnition 5 that the matrix M has all entries equal to zero
except for the six opposite base-points Opp(i1 , i2 ), Opp(i2 , i3 ) and Opp(i3 , i1 ).
That means M = SM [i1 , i2 , i3 ].
Conversely, if M = SM [i1 , i2 , i3 ] is a special matrix, then the only pairs that
satisfy the three conditions (T1), (T2), (T3) are {i1 , i2 }, {i2 , i3 } and {i3 , i1 }.
Theorem 3. For any binary matrix M , if M is not a special matrix then

{S : S ∈ ColluderP air(M )} = ∅
And if M = SM [i1 , i2 , i3 ] then
ColluderP air(M ) = {{Mi1 , Mi2 }, {Mi2 , Mi3 }, {Mi3 , Mi1 }}

Proof. Let Collude(M ) = {S : S ∈ ColluderP air(M )} where M is a nonspecial matrix. Since each member of ColluderP air(M ) is a set that contains
two elements and any two members of ColluderP air(M ) have non-empty intersection (Lemma 3), if |Colluder(M )| > 3 it follows from Lemma 2 that intersection of all members of ColluderP air(M ) is not empty.
If |Colluder(M )| = 3 then ColluderP air(M ) is either equal to {{i1 , i2 }, {i2 , i3 }}
or {{i1, i2 }, {i2 , i3 }, {i3, i1 }}. The latter cannot happen by Lemma 4 because M
is not a special matrix. If |Colluder(M
 )| = 2, then ColluderP air(M ) has only
one member. In all cases, we have {S : S ∈ ColluderP air(M )} = ∅.
Since the pair of the actual colluders is included in the set ColluderP air(M ),
if M is not a special matrix then from the above theorem the intersection of all
members of ColluderP air(M ) is not empty. This intersection is a subset of the
colluders.

3.2

Tracing Algorithm

Given a matrix M formed by two colluders. ¿From Theorem 3, we have the
following trivial tracing algorithm. We consider two cases:
Case 1: M does not have a mark ‘?’
If M is a special matrix, M = SM [i1 , i2 , i3 ], then the two colluders are
among i1 , i2 , i3 ; in this case, the algorithm fails to identify them.
If M is not a special matrix, then we form the set ColludeP air(M ) that
contains all the pairs {i1 , i2 } that satisfy
  (T1), (T2), (T3) in Deﬁnition 5.
A trivial method is to check all n2 pairs {i1 , i2 }. In section 3.3, we use
the properties of the set ColludeP air(M ) to give a faster algorithm to search
for such pairs. Theorem 3 ensures that the intersection of members of the set
ColludeP air(M ) is not empty. This intersection is the colluders. Output this
intersection.
Case 2: M contains marks ‘?’
In this case, we always can ﬁnd a colluder. Firstly, we substitute all the marks
‘?’ by an arbitrary values 0 or 1 so that the resulting matrix M  is not a special
matrix. One way to make this substitution easy is by observing that all special
matrices have weight equal to 6. Therefore, when we substitute the marks ‘?’ by
0 or 1, we need only to ensure that M  has weight not equal to 6 to guarantee
that it is not a special matrix.
Since γ is a binary code, from Lemma 1, the binary matrix M  is a descendant
matrix formed by the two colluders. As in case 1, form the set ColludeP air(M  ),
and the colluder is in the intersection of all members of ColludeP air(M  ).
Tracing error: The only case when the tracing algorithm fails is when M is
a special matrix.
Suppose that the two users 1 and 2 collude and they know that the tracing algorithm is deterministic if the pirate matrix contains at least a mark ‘?’.
The number of special matrices that they can form is n − 2. These matrices are
SM [1, 2, 3], SM [1, 2, 4], . . . , SM [1, 2, n]. Since there are 4n − 8 detectable positions for {M1 , M2 }. ¿From Embedding Assumption, the best strategy that they
have is replacing detectable positions with random marks correspond to 0 or 1.
The total number of the matrices that they can form in this way is 24n−8 . It
follows that the tracing error is not larger than 2n−2
4n−8 . However, if the colluders
have no knowledge about the tracing algorithm then the tracing error is 3n−2
4n−8 .
3.3

Faster Tracing

The main step in tracing algorithm is to determine the set ColluderP
  air(M )
for a non-special matrix M . The trivial solution requires at most n2 steps. In
this section, we present a faster tracing algorithm that use the weight of the
matrices. The weight of a matrix is the number of ones in the matrix.
Theorem 4. Let M ∈ Desc(Mi1 , Mi2 ). If weight(M ) > 6, then
1. there exist at least three 1’s on some row or some column;

2. if a row or a column consists of at least three 1’s then this row or column
must contain one of the base-points bi1 , bi2 .
Proof. The only places that we can ﬁnd entries 1 in M are rows ri1 , ri2 or
columns ci1 , ci2 . We know that at the two opposite base-points (ri1 , ci2 ), (ri2 , ci1 ),
we have two 1’s. Therefore, if there are at most two 1’s on each row and column of M then we have at most four other 1’s in these rows ri1 , ri2 and
columns ci1 , ci2 . It follows that the weight of M cannot exceed 6.
Now suppose that there are at least three 1’s in the same column. This column
must be either column ci1 or ci2 as in the other columns there are at most two
1’s. Similarly, if there are at least three 1’s in the same row, this row must be
either row ri1 or ri2 . This proves the second part of the theorem.
From the above theorem, we can see that if weight(M ) > 6, we only need to
identify a row or a column with three 1’s. Since there is exactly one base-point
in each row or column, the colluder’s base-point will be identiﬁed.
If weight(M ) ≤ 6, then to determine the set
 ColluderP air(M ), using condition (T2), we only need to check for at most 62 = 15 pairs.
Theorem 5. The tracing algorithm either outputs a correct colluder or fails
with probability 2n−2
4n−8 . If the pirate matrix contains at least one mark ‘?’ then
the algorithm correctly outputs a colluder.
3.4

Reducing the Code Length

Since all codewords have the value 0 at base-points, we can remove n positions
corresponding to the n base-points. Moreover, if we choose the n base-point to
be bi = (i, i) then every codeword is a symmetric matrix. Therefore, we only need
to record the lower part of the matrix and so the code has length n(n − 1)/2.

4

Construction from Traceability Codes

In this section we combine the code γ = {M1 , M2 , . . . , Mn } constructed in
the above section with 2-traceability codes to have 2-secure codes with shorter
length. c-Traceability codes are deﬁned as follows.
Definition 6. ([10]) Let Γ be an n-ary code of length L, C = {u1 , · · · , ub } ⊆ Γ ,
where ui = (ai1 , ai2 , · · · , aiL ). Γ is called c-traceability code, or c-TA code for
short, if the following condition is satisfied: for any C ⊆ Γ, |C| ≤ c, and any
(x1 , · · · , xL ) ∈ desc(C), there is a ui ∈ C such that |{j : xj = aij }| > |{j : xj =
aj }| for any (a1 , · · · , aL ) ∈ Γ \ C.
c-TA codes can tolerate some erased positions (positions with ‘?’). The bound
on the maximum number of erasures tolerated by a c-TA code was given in [8].
Let Γ be an n-ary code and C = {u1 , · · · , ub } ⊆ Γ, b ≤ c. Deﬁne a set
F (C; e) = {(x1 , · · · , xL ) ∈ F (C) : |{j : xj =?}| ≤ e}.

Theorem 6. Let Γ be an (L, N, D)q -ECC, and c be an integer.
1. ([10])) If
D > (1 −

1
)L
c2

(2)

then Γ is a c-TA code.
2. ([8]) If
1
e
)L + 2
c2
c
then Γ is c-TA code tolerating e erasures.
D > (1 −

(3)

Let Γ be an n-ary code of length L and size N over an alphabet
{a1 , a2 , . . . , an }. Deﬁne a binary code ∆(Γ, γ) in which each codeword has
length L, and obtained in the following way U = Mi1 Mi2  . . . MiL , where
ai1 ai2 . . . aiL ∈ Γ .
Theorem 7. Suppose γ is an (, n) c-secure code with ε-error, and Γ is an
(L, N, D)n c-TA code satisfying (3). Then ∆(Γ, γ) is a c-secure code with error
at most (εL)e+1 .
Proof. Denote by AO , AI the tracing algorithm for the outer code and the inner
code. Deﬁne a tracing algorithm for code ∆(Γ, γ) as follows. Suppose a pirate
word X = X1 X2  · · · XL is given.
Step 1: Apply AI to each Xj , j = 1, 2, · · · , L. Suppose the output is Mij .
Step 2: Apply AO to ai1 ai2 . . . aiL . The output U of AO is treated as a traitor.
For this tracing, an error happens only if |{j : AI (Xj ) = ∅}| > e. While for AI the
 L  e+1
ε
<
tracing error is ε, so the tracing error for the code ∆(Γ, γ) is at most e+1
e+1
(εL) .
The following is an examples of the resulting 2-secure codes.
Theorem 8. Let n be a prime power, e, k be positive integers such that k ≤


1
4n−8 e+1
,
4 (n − e − 1). There exists a 2-secure code with error (n − 2)(n − 1)/2
the length of the code is n2 (n − 1) and the number of codewords is nk .
Proof. Let Γ be a Reed-Solomon code of length L = n − 1 and dimension k
over GF (n). Then from Theorem 7 ∆(Γ, γ) is a 2-secure code with error at most

e+1
(n − 2)(n − 1)/24n−8
.
The following is a family of 2-TA codes. A code Γ is called an equidistance
code if the Hamming distances between any two codewords are all the same.
Theorem 9. Equidistant code with odd distance is 2-TA code.
Proof. Let X ∈ desc(U1 , U2 ), then d(X, U1 ) + d(X, U2 ) = d(U1 , U2 ) = d. Since d
is odd, it follows that d(X, U1 ) ≤ (d − 1)/2 or d(X, U2 ) ≤ (d − 1)/2.
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Construction from Perfect Hash Families

In this section we construct 2-secure codes with more codewords by combining
a 2-secure code with a perfect hash family. Using this construction with the inner
code given in Section 3 and a perfect hash family given in [1, 11] give a code
k
with 72 codewords and length 16 × 7k .
Definition 7. Let N, n, t be integers, X and Y be sets of size N and n, respectively, F be a family of s functions f : X → Y . F is call a perfect hash family,
denoted by PHF(s; N, n, t), if for any subset Z ⊆ X of size t, there exists an
f ∈ F such that f |Z is one-to-one.
Let γ be an (, n) code, F = {f1 , f2 , · · · , fs : fi : X → Y } be a
PHF(s; N, n, t). Deﬁne a code Ω(γ, F ) consisting of N codewords of length s.
Each codeword in Ω(γ, F ) is labelled by an element x ∈ X, and is deﬁned by
uf1 (x)  uf2 (x)  · · ·  ufs (x)
here  means concatenation, and ufj (x) ∈ Γ for all j.
2
We consider a code Ω(γ, F ), where γ = {M1 , M2 , · · · , Mn } ⊆ {0, 1}n is
the code constructed in Section 3, F = {f1 , f2 , · · · , fs : fi : X → Y } is
a PHF(s; N, n, 4). Suppose C = {U1 , U2 } ⊆ Ω(γ, F ) is a collusion
Ui = Mf1 (xi ) Mf2 (xi )  · · · Mfs (xi ) , i = 1, 2
Then the feasible set of C is given by,
F (C) = {X1 X2  · · · Xs : Xj ∈ F (Mfj (x1 ) , Mfj (x2 ) ), 1 ≤ j ≤ s}
2

Every X ∈ {0, 1}sn is naturally represented by X = X1 X2  · · · Xs with Xj ∈
2
2
{0, 1}n for each j. For a given X ∈ {0, 1}sn , deﬁne
ColluderP air(X) = {S ⊆ Ω(γ, F ) : |S| = 2, X ∈ F (S)}
2

Lemma 5. Let X ∈ {0, 1}sn be given. If S1 , S2 ∈ ColluderP air(X), then
S1 ∩ S2 = ∅.
Proof. Assume Ui = Mf1 (xi ) Mf2 (xi )  · · · Mfs (xi ) and S1 = {U1 , U2 }, S2 =
{U3 , U4 } are disjoint. Since F is a PHF(s; N, n, 4), there exists an fj ∈
F such that fj (x1 ), fj (x2 ), fj (x3 ), fj (x4 ) are distinct and so the two sets
{Mfj (x1 ) , Mfj (x2 ) } and {Mfj (x3 ) , Mfj (x4 ) } are disjoint. It follows that the two
descendant sets of S1 and S2 are disjoint.
Lemma 6. Let X be given. Then either
∩{S : S ∈ ColluderP air(X)} = ∅
or there exists distinct U1 , U2 , U3 such that
ColluderP air(X) = {{U1 , U2 }, {U2 , U3 }, {U3 , U1 }}
Proof. Similar to the proof of Theorem 3.

Lemma 7. If ColluderP air(X) = {{U1 , U2 }, {U2 , U3 }, {U3 , U1 }}
2
where X = X1 X2  · · · Xs ∈ {0, 1}sn and Ui = Mf1 (xi ) Mf2 (xi )  · · · Mfs (xi ) ,
then for each j = 1, 2, . . . , s, either Xj is a special matrix or a codeword matrix.
Proof. We have Xj ∈ Desc(Mfj (x1 ) , Mfj (x2 ) ), Xj ∈ Desc(Mfj (x2 ) , Mfj (x3 ) )
and Xj ∈ Desc(Mfj (x3 ) , Mfj (x1 ) ) for each j = 1, . . . , s.
If Mfj (x1 ) , Mfj (x2 ) and Mfj (x2 ) are three diﬀerent codeword matrices then from
Lemma 4, Xj must be a special matrix.
If Mfj (x1 ) , Mfj (x2 ) and Mfj (x2 ) are not distinct codewords, say Mfj (x1 ) =
Mfj (x2 ) , then it follows from Xj ∈ Desc(Mfj (x1 ) , Mfj (x2 ) ) that Xj = Mfj (x1 ) =
Mfj (x2 ) . In this case, Xj is a codeword matrix.
s
Lemma 8. The tracing error is ε = ( 22n−2
4n−8 ) .

Proof. For each j = 1, . . . , s, the number of special matrix that two colluders can produce is n − 2. Therefore, there are 2n − 2 possibilities that Xj is
a special matrix or a codeword matrix. The probabilities of producing such
a Xj is 22n−2
4n−8 . It follows that the probability to have ColluderP air(X) =
s
{{U1 , U2 }, {U2 , U3 }, {U3 , U1 }} is ( 22n−2
4n−8 ) .
In the following we show the existence of the perfect hash family.
k

Theorem 10. ([1, 11]) There exists a PHF(7k+1 ; 72 , 4, 4) for all k ≥ 0.
Theorem 11. Let k be an integer. There exists a 2-secure code with error ε =
 3 7k+1
k
of length L = 16 × 7k+1 and consisting of N = 72 codewords.
27
k

Proof. Use Fk = P HF (7k+1 ; 72 , 4, 4) and the inner code γ with n = 4, Ω(γ, Fk )
7k+1  3 7k+1

= 27
.
is the 2-secure code with error 22×4−2
4×4−8

6

Comparison and Concluding Remarks

We considered 2-secure ﬁngerprinting codes and presented a number of new
constructions. A c-Secures code provides a tracing algorithm and an estimate of
the highest probability of incorrect tracing. Our main construction, similar to
all other known ones, have two layers. A 2-secure code is used as the inner code
and then an outer structure is used to increase the number of codewords. All
previous inner codes have shortcomings. Our proposed inner codes, improves on
all the known codes by having a number of desirable properties simultaneously.
Most importantly, it ensures that no other innocent users will be accused. The
only other inner code that satisfy this property can exist for very limited range of
number of codewords. Noting that this number is the alphabet size of the outer
structure means that a much wider range of outer structures can be used and
so better c-secure codes can be obtained. We show two general form of outer
structures, one based on 2-TA codes and the second on perfect hash families
and in both cases obtained the probability of incorrect tracing in terms of the
parameters of the inner code and the outer structures.
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